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9/11 Classified Information

September 11th and Subsequent Activities Timeline (U)

(U) The following is a chronology of events related to September 11th, 2001, and its aftermath. Many of these events did not directly involve 1FW operations at that moment, but were of relevant impact to affect wing personnel in the near-term. **Events highlighted in bold included direct involvement of 1st Fighter Wing and Langley Air Force Base personnel.** A narrative section follows this chronology and provides additional details plus a perspective from the wing leadership directly involved in these events. While it is not standard practice to incorporate a chronology within the narrative portion of a history, the following timeline illustrates how the events that shaped our nation's immediate future also effected our local operations.

11 September, 2001 (U)

(U) 0845L (local): A hijacked passenger jet, American Airlines Flight 11 out of Boston, Massachusetts, crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC), tearing a large hole in the building and setting it afire.⁸³

(U) 0900L: **1st Fighter Wing Commander Colonel Stephen Goldfein learned of the burning north tower during a visit to the 1FW Dental Clinic.**⁸⁴

⁸² Memo (U), 94FS/DO to 94FS/CC, "Summary-AEF 01-08, OSW, PSAB," ca 11 Mar 02, SD II-16; Rpt (U), 27 FS, "27FS Lessons Learned," 18 Dec 01, SD II-15; Rpt (U), 94 FS, "94 Lessons Learned," 11 Mar 02 SD II-17

⁸³ Case File (U), Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

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(U) 0903L: A second hijacked airliner, United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston, crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center and explodes. Both buildings are burning.⁸⁵

(U) 0904L: 1FW Command Post received verbal notification from higher headquarters of increased Information Condition (InfoCon) posture and annotates the daily unclassified Command Post Events Log; the first message correspondence to indicate that September 11th would not be an average day.⁸⁶

(U) 0911L: 1FW/CP received notification that the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) opened battle stations and confirmed North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) notified, one of NORAD's three continental US defense sectors.⁸⁷

(U) 0915L: The 1FW Commander directed implementation of Force Protection Alpha and convention of wing battlestaff. The 1FW (several members of Operations and Logistics Groups) initiated actions to prepare Wing F-15C *Eagles* for contingency mission launch.⁸⁸

(U) 0917L: The Federal Aviation Administration shuts down all New York City area airports.⁸⁹

(U) 0926L: F-16's from Langley's Alert Facility scramble to intercept potential threats from additional hijacked airliners.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ Intw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22.

⁸⁵ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

⁸⁶ Rpt (U), 1FW Command Post, "Events Log," 11 Sep-31 Dec 01, SD II-23.

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ Intw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22.

⁸⁹ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

⁹⁰ Rpt (U), 1FW Command Post, "Events Log," 11 Sep-31 Dec 01, SD II-23, filed chronologically.

(U) 0926L: Higher headquarters directed Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Bravo.⁹¹

(U) 0930L: President Bush, speaking in Sarasota, Florida, says the country has suffered an "apparent terrorist attack."⁹²

(U) 0940L: ~~The~~ FAA halts all flight operations at U.S. airports, the first time in U.S. history that air traffic nationwide has been halted.⁹³

(U) 0943L: American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon, sending up a huge plume of smoke. Evacuation begins immediately.⁹⁴

(U) 0945L: The White House evacuates.⁹⁵

(U) 0952L: The 1FW/CP received message from higher headquarters that COMACC implemented FPCON Charlie effective at 0950L.⁹⁶

(U) 1005L: The south tower of the World Trade Center collapses, plummeting into the streets below. A massive cloud of dust and debris forms and slowly drifts away from the building.⁹⁷

(U) 1010L: A portion of the Pentagon collapses.⁹⁸

(U) 1010L: United Airlines Flight 93, also hijacked, crashes in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, southeast of Pittsburgh.⁹⁹

⁹¹ Rpt (U), 1FW Command Post, "Events Log," 11 Sep-31 Dec 01, SD II-23

⁹² CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

⁹³ *Ibid*

⁹⁴ *Ibid*

⁹⁵ *Ibid*

⁹⁶ Msg (U), ACC Command Center to 1FW Command Post, "Force Protection Condition Change," 11 Sep 01, 1037L, SD II-24.

⁹⁷ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*

(U) 1028L: The World Trade Center's north tower collapses from the top down, releasing a cloud of debris and smoke.¹⁰⁰

(U) 1035L: The Command Post issued Battle Staff Directive (BSD) number 1 restricting movement off base and limiting movement on-base. Also at 1035L, BSD 2 directs the activation of all Unit Control Centers (UCC's) by 1100 hrs.¹⁰¹

(U) 1045L: All federal office buildings in Washington are evacuated.¹⁰²

(U) 1050L: Higher headquarters, Air Combat Command Commander (COMACC) directed FPCON DELTA, the first time that Langley AFB had ever been in a real-world DELTA condition.¹⁰³

(U) 1118L: American Airlines reports it has lost two aircraft. American Flight 11, a Boeing 767 flying from Boston to Los Angeles, had 81 passengers and 11 crew aboard. Flight 77, a Boeing 757 en route from Washington's Dulles International Airport to Los Angeles, had 58 passengers and six crew members aboard. Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center and Flight 77 hit the Pentagon.¹⁰⁴

(U) 1125L: BSD 3 required all UCC's to perform 100 percent accountability of personnel and brief Force Protection Condition (FPCON) status, currently FPCON DELTA.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*

¹⁰¹ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-46," 11 Sep-12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

¹⁰² CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹⁰³ Msg (U), HQ ACC/DOXC to HQ ACC/CAT, "Force protection Condition Alerting Message," 11 Sep 01, 1124L, SD II-26.

¹⁰⁴ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹⁰⁵ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-46," 11 Sep-12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

(U) 1126L: United Airlines reports that United Flight 93, en route from Newark, New Jersey, to San Francisco, California, has crashed in Pennsylvania. The airline also says that it is "deeply concerned" about United Flight 175.¹⁰⁶

(U) 1159L: United Airlines confirmed that Flight 175, from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the World Trade Center's south tower with 56 passengers and nine crew members aboard.¹⁰⁷

(U) 1200L: Colonel Goldfein declared two 1FW jets ready for action to acting ACC Commander General Cook (officially ACC Vice Commander). Gen Cook directed launch of available 1FW jets.¹⁰⁸

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(U) 1212L: Non-essential personnel released, essential personnel instructed to begin 12-hour shifts at 2000L. The 1MDG has prepared to mobilize it's Emergency Medical Facility (EMEDS) and is awaiting orders.¹¹⁰

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¹⁰⁶ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹⁰⁷ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹⁰⁸ Intvw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22.

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¹¹⁰ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-45" 112500Z 12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

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(U) 1304L: Pres. Bush, speaking from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, says that all appropriate security measures are being taken, including putting the U.S. military on high alert worldwide. He asks for prayers for those killed or wounded in the attacks and says, "Make no mistake, the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts."¹¹⁴

(U) 1319L: The F-16 *Vipers* from Langley's alert facility returned to base for refuel and crew change.¹¹⁵

(U) 1344L: The Pentagon says five warships and two aircraft carriers will leave the U.S. Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia, to protect the East Coast from further attack and to reduce the number of ships in port. The two carriers, the USS George Washington and the USS John F. Kennedy, are headed for the New York coast. The other ships headed to sea are frigates and guided missile destroyers capable of shooting down aircraft.¹¹⁶

(U) 1348L: Pres. Bush leaves Barksdale AFB aboard Air Force One and flies to Offutt AFB, Nebraska.¹¹⁷

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¹¹⁴ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹¹⁵ Rpt (U), 1FW Command Post, "Events Log," 11 Sep-31 Dec 01, SD II-23.

¹¹⁶ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

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(U) 1400L: Senior FBI officials announce the likelihood that the four hijacked and crashed airplanes were part of a coordinated terrorist attack.¹¹⁸

(U) 1425L: All 1FW units instructed to initiate contact with all members in the DC/NYC area and report NLT 1530L IAW BSD 5.¹¹⁹

(U) 1430L: The FAA announces there will be no U.S. commercial air traffic until noon EDT Wednesday at the earliest.¹²⁰

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(U) 1555L: A White House official says the president is at an undisclosed location, later revealed to be Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, and is conducting a National Security Council meeting by phone. Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice are in a secure facility at the White House. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is at the Pentagon.¹²²

(U) 1600L: U.S. officials say there are "good indications" that Saudi militant Osama bin Laden, suspected of coordinating the bombings of two U.S.

¹¹⁷ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21

¹¹⁸ Ibid

¹¹⁹ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-46," 11 Sep-12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

¹²⁰ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

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¹²² CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

embassies in 1998, is involved in the attacks, based on "new and specific" information developed since the attacks.¹²³

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(U) 1730L: U.S. officials say the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania could have been headed for one of three possible targets: Camp David, the White House or the U.S. Capitol building. It is later determined the first F-16's launched from the Langley alert facility could have intercepted this aircraft before it struck around Wash DC.¹²⁶

(U) 1800L: Explosions are heard near Kabul, Afghanistan, the attacks occurred at 0200 in Afghanistan. U.S. officials say later that the United States had no involvement in the incident whatsoever. The attack is credited to the Northern Alliance, a group fighting the Taliban in the country's ongoing civil war.¹²⁷

(U) 1840L: Rumsfeld, the U.S. defense secretary, holds a news conference in the Pentagon, noting the building is operational. "It will be in business tomorrow."¹²⁸

(U) 1928L: Per BSD 10, the USAF established emergency phone numbers for members separated from their units and a phone number for latest info releasable to the public.¹²⁹

¹²³CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21

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¹²⁵ Rpt (U), 1FW Command Post, "Events Log," 11 Sep-31 Dec 01, SD II-23; Rpt (S/DECL X3) 27FS Intel, "Flight Reports," 11-21 Sep 01, SD II-29.

¹²⁶ Intvw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22.

¹²⁷ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹²⁸ Ibid

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(U) 1922L: The fire at the Pentagon is still burning and is considered contained but not under control.¹³⁰

(U) 1928L: Battle Staff Directive 10 announced the creation of two telephone hotlines, one for latest information release and another for any AF member at the accident sites to contact their home units.¹³¹

(U) 2000L: The 1FW/CP hosted a Senior Battle Staff meeting. After meeting for a portion of the afternoon, Colonel Goldfein determined that the 1FW Senior Battle Staff would meet at 0800 and 2000 daily until further notice. This meeting would closely follow the ACC Battle Staff Meetings at 0700 and 1900.¹³²

(U) 2030L: President Bush addressed the nation. "The U.S. government will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed the acts and those who harbor them."¹³³

(U) 2043L: 190 members left Langley for McGuire AFB, NJ with 18 pallets of materials to set up EMEDS for potential casualties of the attacks on New York City. The group included 170 troops from the 1MDG, 15 Logistics Readiness Squadron, Transportation personnel, and 5 from the 1FW Chaplain's office.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-46," 11 Sep-12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

¹³⁰ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹³¹ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹³² Notes (S, DECL OADR, derived from Battlestaff Briefing Slides), 1FW Historian, "Battle staff notes, 11-26 Sep 01, (Info Used is U), SD II-30.

¹³³ CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹³⁴ Rpt (U), 1 Aerospace Medical Squadron/SGPRR, "After Action Report, 1MDG Deployment in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE," c.a. Dec 01, SD II-

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(U) 2132L: BSD 11 directed limited off base and DSN phone calls to official use only. Due to heavy call volume, some mission essential calls could not be completed.¹³⁵

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12 September (U)

(U) 2145L: North East Air Defense Sector ordered the launch of two Wing F-15's and officially tasked 24-hour CAP manning in the DC area until further notice.¹³⁹

(U) 0539L: The EMEDS convoy arrived at McGuire AFB¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-46," 11 Sep-12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

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¹³⁹ Ibid

¹⁴⁰ Rpt (U), 1FW Command Post, "Events Log, 11 Sep-31 Dec 01," SD II-23.

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NCT0038167

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31 December (U)

(U) At years end, the 1FW had 152 troops deployed to various locations in support of OEF and 106 deployed for ONE. Of the troops "deployed" for ONE, 102 were from the 74ACS who performed duty at Langley AFB and considered in deployed status, although Langley was their home station.¹⁸⁷

September 11th and Subsequent Activities Narrative (U)

(U) On September 11, 2001, the U.S. received a sucker-punch to the jaw of unparalleled proportion, as terrorists slammed hijacked commercial airliners into the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon. Historians well into the future will surely consider this well-chronicled attack an event of epic proportions; and the subsequent retaliation also. As 1FW Historians, we needed to focus on the events as they effected 1FW operations.¹⁸⁸

(U) At 0845L that morning, a commercial airliner, American Airlines Flight 11 out of Boston, crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. The wing commander Colonel Stephen Goldfein, first learned of the incident during an appointment at the Dental Clinic.¹⁸⁹

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¹⁸⁷ Slides (U), 1LRS/LGRR, "Wing Deployments," Oct-Dec 01, SD II-57.

¹⁸⁸ Case File 1 (U), Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹⁸⁹ Intw (U), MSgt Cairn, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22, Case File 1 (U), Personal HO experience,

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(U) "I had just walked into the dental clinic and everybody was standing, there's a TV right there in the waiting room. My first thought was that was weird and second (thought) ~~was~~ that people were looking at one of the towers burning. ~~So I actually walked in after the first one hit but before the second.~~ So I actually walked ~~in after~~ the first one hit but before the second. My first thought was the 14th Street Bridge, International Airport several years ago (in Washington D.C.) So I was thinking about the closest airport and made an assumption that it must have been a terrible tragedy. I went on back to get in the chair and have some work done."¹⁹⁰

(U) The Operations Group Commander Colonel Stanley Kresge also thought the incident was initially an accident. "When the first airliner hit, I was walking over to one of the squadrons and someone said an airliner had just crashed into the World Trade Center. So I'm figuring, what bozo pilot could have run his aircraft into a building that big? The weather can't be that bad."¹⁹¹

(U) Probable accident in the minds of most, turned to certain attack in the minds of all, just minutes later. Many people watched in horror as a second aircraft, United Airlines Flight 175, also from Boston, struck the south tower of the World Trade Center. The first official notification that operations would be abnormal for a long time at Langley, came to the 1FW Command Post at 0904L,

various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21.

¹⁹⁰ Intvw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22.

¹⁹¹ Intvw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Kresge, 1OG/CC, 19 Nov 01,

~~1FW/HO with Col Kresge, 1OG/CC, 19 Nov 01, SD II-22.~~

~~Case File 1 (U) Personal File~~

just one minute after the second aircraft crashed. A message from North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) directed an Infocon upgrade to Alpha and NORAD manned their battle stations. (Ironically, due to a decreased threat from hacker and virus attacks on the computer networks across the US, the Infocon had been dropped to condition Normal at 0909L the previous evening.)¹⁹²

(U) Col Goldfein directed implementation of Force Protection Condition Alpha at 0915 after he heard of the second attack on the south tower. "When word came through about the second (crash), I figured something's got to be up. I said on the radio "go to Threatcon Alpha." For lack of a better thought, I just wanted to get moving towards something." At 0926L, higher headquarters stepped up the FPCON to Bravo. After conferring with Vice Commander Colonel James Reed, Col Goldfein directed a battle staff be convened at 1015L.¹⁹³

(U) As the wing commander attempted to gather key leadership together, the 1st Fighter Wing Command Post was already busy. They received orders from NORAD, through the Northeast Defense Sector, to scramble the Langley alert jets. The 1FW Command Post physically flipped a switch to activate the klaxon alarm at the alert facility and activate the launch of two F-16's from the 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota Air National Guard, stationed at Langley's Alert

¹⁹² CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21; Rpt (U), 1FW Command Post, "Events Log," 11 Sep-31 Dec 01, SD II-23; Intw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Capt Bailey, 1FW/CP, 04 Mar 02, SD II-59.

¹⁹³ Rpt (U), 1FW Command Post, "Events Log," 11 Sep-31 Dec 01, SD II-23; Intw (U), MSgt Gairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22.

Detachment. The orders went from the CP directly to the alert facility and Langley's air traffic controllers, with the wing being disconnected from that activity in the opening minutes.¹⁹⁴

(U) "It's just a process scramble instruction and it doesn't normally come with a "this country's under attack" or "go do this and go do that," they just get scrambled," said Col Goldfein. "And they do practices, a couple a week. I don't think it registered with any of us when two Vipers (alert F-16's) took off, as they do all the time."¹⁹⁵

(U) Simultaneously, the 1FW Operations Group began to load the *Eagles* with munitions in preparation for combat missions of their own, an event under rapid consideration by the 1OG Commander. "I immediately started thinking, OK, someone's going to call here pretty soon and say, "we want jets airborne," and within minutes a young major from NORAD called and asked "how long is it going to take you to get jets airborne with something that shoots?" And that's when we launched into basically a full generation of jets and within a couple hours, we actually had the first couple airborne."¹⁹⁶

not the
(U) Due to the surprise and urgency, those initial F-16 alert jet sorties launched without missiles, but did carry loaded guns onboard. However, the scrambled jets could not react in time to prevent the next act of terror. At 0943L,

¹⁹⁴ Intvw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Capt Bailey, 1FW/CP, 04 Mar 02, SD II-59.

¹⁹⁵ Intvw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22.

¹⁹⁶ Intvw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Presge, 1OG/CC, 15 Nov 01, SD II-58.

another hijacked airliner, American Airlines Flight 77, slammed into the Pentagon and added more destruction to the chaotic mix of events. There was still more tragedy as a fourth hijacked airliner plunged to the ground in Pennsylvania at 1010L. The alert aircraft would have been in position to down the fourth airliner had it reached the proximity of its projected target, the White House. Shortly thereafter, higher headquarters directed implementation of FPCON Delta and force protection became one of the key leadership concerns.¹⁹⁷

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(U) The Security Forces quickly moved to achieve full FPCON Delta posture. In concert with ready augmentees from the 1st Communications, Civil Engineer, and ACC's Regional Supply Squadron as well as vehicles from the 1st Transportation Squadron, the 1st SFS sealed the base. They put augmented forces on the roads and gates, constructed barriers, restricted parking, manned single point entries, and retrieved cached heavy machine guns.¹⁹⁸

(U) In an effort to maintain tight security and keep lanes open for whatever military response was required, Battle Staff Directive (BSD) number 1, issued at 1035L, directed personnel to restrict movement off-base and to limit movement on-base. The second BSD ordered all Survival Recovery Center (SRC) personnel to report to the Command Post immediately and all Unit Control

¹⁹⁷ Intw (U), 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22; CF 1 (U) Personal HO experience, various news service articles, television reports, and other correspondence filed chronologically as SD II-21. JC

¹⁹⁸ Intw (U), SSgt Deshetler, 1FW/HO with Lt Col Decknick, 1SFS/CC, 24 Jan 02, SD II-22. K- sge, 10G/CC: 19

Centers (UCC's) to stand-up by 1100L. At 1125L, BSD#3 directed the UCC;s to do a 100 percent accountability of their personnel and brief them on FPCON status. The process to organize and mobilize wing personnel for combat had begun.¹⁹⁹

(U) During the early minutes of the still-forming senior battle staff meeting , Lt Col Faega, Commander, 27th Fighter Squadron, volunteered to ready the pilots for launch.

(U) "I looked at the wing commander, and said 'hey, boss, I'll get a four ship airborne just as quickly as I can. I've got to get out of here (command post battlestaff) so I can start working this,' so I just kind of took it and started running with it. He's (wing commander) going, 'yeah, go ahead and do what you can.' I wasn't sure what armament and what weapons loaders had gotten out to the flightline yet. I'm thinking to myself, 'this is what it's going to take, having a radar missile and a heat missile would be fine.' Having a gun's not that important at this point," said Lt Col Faega. "There are no tables that talk about how to take down a liner (airliner). I don't think we have even considered this before."²⁰⁰

(U) He also initiated maintenance actions to prepare the jets for combat. Col Faega directed maintenance personnel to load external tanks and have weapons loaders load what they could, as quickly as they could. At that point, he also directed that the 27th FS be the central point for all operations.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-46," 11 Sep-12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

²⁰⁰ Intvw (S/NF/DECL X3, classification derived from 27FS Flight Report Debriefs), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Lt Col Faega, 27FS/CC, 25 Jan 02 (Info used is U), SD I-4

²⁰¹ Ibid

(U) "I figure we're set up for it because we have already been working some combined operations. So instantly everyone available packed up from the other two squadrons and trundled over to our squadron. At that point, we are looking at who is available, and the pilots available are not all from our squadron. So now we've got a rainbow effort of pilots, my wingman was from the 71st.²⁰²

(U) In the briefing room, Lt Col Faega began to realize the potential ramifications of the impending mission. "We figured out what was going on at this point. We know that there's a possibility there are other airliners out there that are going to be a threat to the capital. We figured that we are going to be deployed to the capital as a backstop and just set a defensive counter air, if you will, over the capital. We had no idea at this point what the ROE (rules of engagement) was, we had no idea about who was going to control us."²⁰³

(U) Colonel Goldfein received a phone call soon after convening the battlestaff from ACC Vice Commander, General Donald Cook, who asked how quickly the 1FW could be loaded and airborne. After some phone tag between the two, at high noon, 1200L, Col. Goldfein proclaimed the 1FW jets ready. General Cook gave verbal orders to launch with no specific instruction about what to do when airborne.²⁰⁴

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²⁰³ Intvw (S/NF/DECL X3, classification derived from 27FS Flight Report Debriefs), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Lt Col Faega, 27FS/CC, 25 Jan 02, (Info used is U) SD I-4

²⁰⁴ Intvw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22

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(U) "By the time they went to step (launch the jets) there was a verbal on the line, validated from General Cook to me, which was rules of engagement are either authorized or enforced to protect the country, but that was about it. That's a little broad for the normal business we do."²⁰⁵

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²⁰⁵Intvw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22.

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²⁰⁷ Ibid

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²⁰⁹ Rot (U). 1FW Command Post. "Events Log," 11 Sep-31 Dec 01, SD II-

23:

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²¹¹ *Ibid*

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(U) The F-16's that launched from the alert facility earlier, later returned to base to refuel and borrow missiles from the 1FW, a request that came from the unit during the initial stages. The wing commander handled those requests.²¹⁶

(U) "Their first couple of direct calls where I took them in the Battle Staff were, 'can we borrow some munitions? All we have is the gun loaded.' Here's what we have evolved to over time and our perception of being prepared for Continental (US) attacks. Those guys are only loaded with a live gun. It is a deadly weapon but number one, it is harder to use and number two, it's more difficult to get the job done. There would be no downside whatsoever to these guys having live missiles and live missiles may be the difference in the guys ability to do the mission. You can have a low-altitude chasing an airliner and gunning it and blowing it up is not that easy."²¹⁷

(U) As the magnitude of the events became clearer, and the potential for further direct assaults on U.S. installations considered a possibility, BSD 4 directed that non-essential personnel be sent home at staggered intervals between 1200 and 1500L. Most AAFES and MWR facilities closed indefinitely.²¹⁸

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²¹⁶ Intw (U), MSgt Cairo, 1FW/HO with Col Goldfein, 1FW/CC and Col Reed, 1FW/CV, 7 Nov 01, SD II-22.

²¹⁷ *Ibid*

²¹⁸ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase 2 Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-46," 11 Sep-12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

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(U) In response to the possibility of mass casualties beyond the New York City area's control, the 1st Medical Group deployed 170 troops to McGuire AFB, NJ, where they constructed an Emergency Medical System (EMEDS). Analogous to a field hospital, the EMEDS had capability of handling patients and 20 major surgeries in a 24-hour period. As it would be determined over the next week, no patients made it to the facility for two major reasons. First, New York did have capability to tend to the wounded, and second, the instant fatality total

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overwhelmed the total wounded, rendering hospital support unnecessary. (see Operation NOBLE EAGLE, this chapter) ²²¹

(U) Also during that 2000L, 11 September Battle Staff, the 1FW/CC declared that only mission essential personnel would return to work the next morning, September 12. There were no additional BSD's issued that evening and wing leadership declared battle staff would convene bi-daily at 2000L and 0800, following the ACC Battle staffs attended by Col Goldfein. ²²²

(U) When the human tragedy and potential for mass casualties in NY and Wash DC became obvious, BSD 5 called for units to initiate contact with all personnel in those areas to ensure their safety and accountability. This need for humanitarian information continued to be stressed, as BSD 10 listed contact phone numbers for a public hotline containing updates on the situation and another phone number to AFPC for AF members near or at the incident sites who may have become disconnected from their units. At 2132L, due to heavy call volume on base, BSD 11 directed that all phone calls off-base, commercial and DSN, be limited to official use only. ²²³

(U) On 12 September, most American's awoke to the prospect of a different world, and the 1st Fighter Wing did also. The first BSD of the day, number 12, although not operationally significant, hinted at some fragment of

²²¹ Notes (S, DECL OADR, derived from Battlestaff Briefing Slides), 1FW Historian, "Battle staff notes, 11-26 Sep 01, (Info Used is U), SD II-30.

²²² Ibid

SD II-30.

²²³ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-46," 11 Sep-12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

normalcy as the AAFES Shoppette's returned to normal operating hours. Injuries at the incident sites prompted need for emergency blood drives in the local area. Many wing personnel joined other Langley members and the local community to give blood at various locations. Battle Staff Directive 14, released at 1350, required UCC's to conduct 100 percent accountability of their personnel.²²⁴

(U) On the afternoon of 12 September at 1344L, BSD 15 directed the implementation of FPCON Charlie, dropping the FPCON after over 24 hours in condition Delta, a first for the wing at Langley in a non-exercise situation. The wing commander directed normal duty hours for wing personnel on Thursday morning, 13 September, leaving reporting times to each commander's discretion to account for the anticipated traffic backup at the gates due to 100 percent ID checks on every vehicle. This move proved very insightful as some members waited in-line for over one hour for base entry in subsequent days.²²⁵

(U) At 1600L, 1FW Protocol Office announced a memorial service for victims of the tragedy to be held Friday afternoon at Langley's Memorial Park. In what amounted to mere formality at this point, there were many more events cancelled than scheduled, including Langley's annual Tattoo scheduled for 13-14 September.²²⁶

²²⁴ Email (U), 1FW Command Post to 1FW Historian as part of Phase Exercise Distro List, "BSD's 1-46," 11 Sep-12 Oct 01, SD II-25.

²²⁵ Ibid

²²⁶ Notes (S) DECL QADR derived from Battlestaff Briefing Slides, 1FW Historian, Battle Staff Notes, 11-26 Sep 01, (Info used is U), SD II-30.

TIME	RECORD OF EVENTS
2045	LTCOL AKEY - STATE HQ Called Looking For MANPOWER #'s
2100	TRANS DROPPED OFF DIP TRUCK for replacement of SOF TRUCK.
2110	NOTIFIED ALL UCC'S THAT ALL PERSONNEL REPORT TO WORK tomorrow Per Col A - Shifting remains 24/7
	Non-Essential Normal Hours.
2115	Began Calling UCC'S for manpower #'s.
2200	Base Page Force Protection Condition Delta Reminder.
2350	LTC Aylward Looking For COTS for Pilots to rest in.
2415	Base Page Force Protection Condition Delta Reminder.
2420	Contacted CBCG Looking for COTS - will research and get back to us.
	SVS - has no COTS available Per Sgt Bailey.
0030	LTC Sandra Ward called has COTS - will trade for Lunches.
0051	COTS ARRIVED and provided to "C" flight
0100	BASE PAGE Force Protection Condition Delta Reminder
0200	BASE PAGE Force Protection Condition Delta Reminder
0210	SFS Requested Adjustment in night lighting on South Bound side of flightline due to security concerns
0240	SFS REQUEST A LIGHT CART AT THE I GATE. AGE HAS NONE AVAILABLE.
0315	BASE PAGE Force Condition Delta Reminder
0325	Command Post phone used by sentry is not working properly. 102 FW/SC has been notified.
0352	Phone in Command Post is fixed.
0405	BASE PAGE Force Protection Condition Delta Reminder
0415	Hole in fence by gate #30 near Landing
0444	Hole in fence was determined to be an old hole and ladder was determined to belong to ECC contractor

(THIS FORM SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 - SEE REVERSE)

MISSION DATA

MISSION DATA									
1. DATE	2. MDS	3. SERIAL NO.	4. UNIT CHARGED FOR FLY HOURS (HSSA CODE)	5. LOCATION	6. OTIS ANG BASE MA				
7. MISSION SYMBOL	8. MISSION NUMBER	9. FROM (ICAO)	10. TO (ICAO)	11. TAKE OFF TIME (Z)	12. LAND TIME (Z)	13. FLIGHT TIME	14. TOUCH AND GO	15. FULL STOP	16. SPECIAL USE
1. F-15A	0001091	77000111							
2. 1	1	KFMH	KFMH	1255	1347	0.9	0	1	1
3. 2	2								
4. 3	3								
5. 4	4								
6. 5	5								
7. 6	6								
17. OPERATING UNIT				TOTALS	0.9	0	1	1	1
102 FW									

AIRCRAFT DATA

FLYING ORGN	SSN	LAST NAME	FLYING	DUTY CODE	PL COMP										TOTAL	SERIES	PL COMP			32	33
					PRIMARY	SECONDARY	USING	EVALUATOR	OTHER	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	USING									
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33						
0101		RICHARD, MARTIN, MAJ	MP	0.9																	

34. MAINT REVIEW

35. PILOT REVIEW

36. OPS REVIEW

37. DATE AND TIME

AFRMS PROCESSING COMPLETED

SIGNATURE

DEVICE IDENT

AF TO FORM 751, 1999 0629 (EF.V1) (COMPUTER GENERATED)

AFORMS AIRCRAFT MISSION FLIGHT DATA DOCUMENT

AFRMS PROCESSING COMPLETED

MISSION DATA

AIRCRAFT DATA

AFQT FORM 781 99900629 (EF-V1) (COMPUTER GENERATED)